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INTRODUCTION 
The large majority of investor-state disputes arise within the 
context of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)—known as Foreign 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs) in Canada.
1
  
BITs provide standards of protection for investors from a treaty state 
and their investments in another treaty state.  They also provide 
procedural mechanisms for the settlement of disputes through 
arbitration directly between the investor and the host state.  Canada is 
currently a party to twenty-four FIPAs
2
 and four Free Trade 
                                                 
* Barry Leon (bleon@perlaw.ca) and Andrew McDougall 
(amcdougall@perlaw.ca) are partners and John Siwiec (jsiwiec@perlaw.ca) is 
an associate in the International Arbitration Group at Perley-Robertson, Hill & 
McDougall LLP in Ottawa, Canada (http://www.perlaw.ca/en/expertise/ 
international-arbitration). Barry Leon is Chair of ICC Canada. Both Barry Leon 
and Andrew McDougall serve as arbitrators, and all three authors serve as 
counsel in international arbitrations. The authors are grateful to Falon Miligan 
and Conor Cronin for their assistance with this article. 
1 Investor-State Disputes Arising from Investment Treaties: A Review, 
UNCTAD SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT, 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20054_en.pdf. 
2 Listing of Canada’s Existing FIPAs, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA, available at http://www.international.gc.ca/
trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/fipa_list.aspx?lang= 
en&menu_id=14&view=d (last modified Sept. 26, 2011). Canada has signed 
but not yet ratified FIPAs with South Africa, Kuwait and El Salvador. Canada 
is also negotiating FIPAs with, inter alia, China, India, Tanzania, Mali, and 
Bahrain. Canada’s Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements 
(FIPAs): Canada’s FIPA Program, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL 
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Agreements (FTAs) that provide for investor-state arbitration, most 
notably Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)
3
 between Canada, the United States and Mexico.  For ease of 
reference, both FIPAs and FTAs that include investor-state arbitration 
will be referred to as Investment Treaty Agreements (ITAs). 
This article addresses three issues of particular interest regarding 
Canada’s experience with investor-state arbitration.  The first section 
examines the fact that Canada has not ratified the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States (ICSID Convention)
4
 and is therefore not a member of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  
The second section addresses an issue that Canada faces as a federal 
state with ITAs.  Increasingly, Canada has had to foot the bill for the 
measures its provinces and territories have taken that have been 
contrary to Canada’s obligations under NAFTA Chapter Eleven.  
Debate exists over who should ultimately be held to pay for damages 
awarded through investor-state arbitration in these kinds of cases.  The 
third section looks at how Canada has emerged as a leader in defending 
investment treaty claims relating to health and environmental 
protection regulation.  Canada has had varied experiences dealing with 
such claims.  However, recent decisions impacting Canada seem to 
indicate that a state’s investment treaty obligations should not impede 
its ability to regulate in the public interest.  This article concludes that, 
although Canada has room to improve in certain areas related to 
investment treaty arbitration, the investment treaty system largely 
works. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                 
TRADE CANADA, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx?view=d (last modified Sept. 26, 
2011). 
3 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, U.S.-Can-Mex., 1992, 
32 I.L.M. 605, 639-49 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].  
4 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter 
ICSID Convention], available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/ 
Volume%20575/volume-575-I-8359-English.pdf.; see also Markus Koehnen & 
Robert Wisner, The Arbitration Review of the Americas: Canada, GLOBAL 
ARBITRATION REVIEW, available at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com 
/reviews/32/sections/115/chapters/1204/canada/. 
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I.   CANADA AND THE ICSID CONVENTION 
ITAs typically contain the host state’s consent to arbitrate and 
provide the means by which a disputing investor can submit a claim.  
As investor-state arbitration has evolved, the ICSID Convention has 
established a widely accepted method for the adjudication of investor-
state disputes.  The ICSID Convention was formulated by the World 
Bank in the 1960s, and has risen to prominence as 147 states have 
ratified the Convention, while an additional 10—including Canada—
have signed but not yet ratified it.
5
 
As is made clear in its preamble, the ICSID Convention is focused 
on “the need for international cooperation for economic development, 
and the role of private international investment” and “the possibility 
that from time to time disputes may arise in connection with such 
investment between” a foreign investor and the state in which the 
foreign investor has invested.
6
  The ICSID Convention provides a 
system for investor-state dispute settlement by offering standard 
clauses, detailed rules of procedure and institutional support, which 
extends to the selection of arbitrators and to the conduct of arbitration 
proceedings.
7
  Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention states that “[t]he 
jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any 
constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to 
the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, 
which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the 
Centre.” 8 
                                                 
5 ICSID, List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the 
Convention (May 5, 2011), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&langua
ge=English. Membership in ICSID is not without controversy as in the last five 
years both Bolivia (3 November 2007) and Ecuador (7 January 2010) have 
withdrawn from the Convention. ICSID Annual Report 2007, 4 (2007), 
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType= 
ICSIDPublicationsRH&action=ViewAnnualReports&year=2007_Eng; ICSID 
Annual Report 2010, 9 (2010), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnnualRep
orts&year=2010_Eng. 
6 ICSID, supra note 4, preamble.  
7 See RUDOLPH DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, at 223 (2008). 
8 ICSID, supra note 4, art. 25(1).  
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Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of ICSID is that it provides 
a binding agreement that Convention members will comply with an 
arbitral award rendered in a dispute.
9
  Each Contracting State to the 
ICSID Convention is required to recognize an ICSID award as binding 
and equivalent to a judgment of the highest court in their country.
10
  
Moreover, ICSID awards are not open to appeal and are subject to 
limited review only by a second ICSID tribunal, known as an ICSID 
annulment committee, rather than by any country’s courts.11  
ICSID also adopted Additional Facility Rules that authorize the 
ICSID Secretariat to administer certain categories of proceedings 
between states and nationals of other states that fall outside the scope of 
the ICSID Convention.
12
  In particular, the Additional Facility Rules 
cover arbitration proceedings for investment disputes where only one of 
the parties is a Contracting State to the ICSID Convention or a national 
of a Contracting State.  A glaring difference, and disadvantage in the 
eyes of foreign investors, between the ICSID Convention and the 
Additional Facility Rules is that an award rendered under the 
Additional Facility Rules can be subject to review by national courts at 
the place of enforcement whereas an ICSID tribunal award cannot.
13
   
Given that the ICSID Convention has achieved such wide 
acceptance, one would expect that Canada—a G8 and G20 country 
with the desire to attract foreign investment and with so many 
businesses and individuals that invest internationally and engage in 
international projects—would be a party to it.  ICSID membership 
would benefit Canada’s international investors and enhance Canada’s 
reputation as a foreign investor-friendly country by giving foreign 
                                                 
9 ICSID, supra note 4, art. 53(1) (“The award shall be binding on the 
parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except 
those provided for in this Convention. Each party shall abide by and comply 
with the terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement shall have 
been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this Convention.”). 
10 Id. 
11 See ICSID, supra note 4, arts. 50-55. 
12 Schedule C to the Additional Facility Rules sets out the Arbitration 
(Additional Facility) Rules. The Additional Facility Rules were created by the 
Administrative Council of ICSID on September 27, 1978. ICSID, Rules 
Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the 
Secretariat of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes [hereinafter Additional Facility Rules], available at http://icsid. 
worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf. 
13 Compare Additional Facility Rules, supra note 12, arts. 52-57, with 
ICSID, supra note 4, arts 50-55.  
2011] CANADA AND INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: 67  
 THREE PROMINENT ISSUES—ICSID RATIFICATION, 
 CONSTITUENT SUBDIVISIONS, AND HEALTH AND 
 ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
 
investors in Canada access to the protections and benefits of ICSID 
arbitration. 
 
A. CANADA’S INVESTMENT TREATY PRACTICE 
Canada’s ITAs generally provide that an investor can submit a 
claim to arbitration under four sets of rules: (i) the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules; (ii) the ICSID Additional Facility Rules; (iii) the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration 
Rules; or, (iv) another body of rules such as the London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA) Arbitration Rules.
14
 
Although ICSID arbitration is specified in Canada’s ITAs as a 
potential dispute resolution mechanism, Canada has not ratified the 
ICSID Convention.  As a result, both Canadian investors investing 
abroad and foreign investors in Canada cannot invoke the ICSID 
Convention to govern their arbitration.  Canada’s reference to the 
ICSID Convention in its ITAs suggests that Canada intends to one day 
become a member.  However, the fact remains that the ICSID 
Convention has been open for signature since 1965 and Canada has yet 
to ratify the treaty.  
This is not to say that there has not been any movement by Canada.  
On December 15, 2006, Canada signed the ICSID Convention, and 
Canada’s federal government passed implementing legislation to ratify 
the Convention in March 2008.
15
  However, the Canadian federal 
government has yet to issue an order that would implement it.  The 
delay in implementation can largely be attributed to the fact that only 
four of ten provinces (British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador, 
Ontario, and Saskatchewan) and two of three territories (Nunavut and 
                                                 
14 See NAFTA, supra note 3; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments, Can.-Thai., art. 13, Sept. 28, 1998, available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/ 
pdfs/THAILAND-E.PDF, Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments. Can.-Jordan, art. 27, June 28 2009, http://www.international. 
gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/jordan-
agreement-jordanie-accord.aspx?lang=eng&view=d. 
15 ICSID, supra note 4. 
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Northwest Territories) have passed legislation to implement the 
Convention.
16
 
Of the provinces yet to adopt supporting legislation, Alberta and 
Quebec stand out.  The benefits of ICSID membership to these 
provinces could be significant given the nature of their economies and 
the international involvement of their companies.  Both provinces have 
vast natural resources including oil and gas, hydro-electric power and 
forestry.  They also have companies in these sectors and in others, such 
as aerospace and engineering, which are active around the world.  As 
discussed below, Alberta and Quebec have never indicated that they 
oppose the substance of the Convention, leading some to believe that 
they are using their resistance to adopt supporting legislation as a 
means to seek concessions in other areas of federal-provincial relations. 
 
B. CANADA’S FEDERALIST STRUCTURE 
Before ratifying the ICSID Convention, it appears that Canada 
would prefer to have the support of all of its provinces and territories 
given Canada’s federal structure.17  As in most federal states, powers 
are allocated by Canada’s constitution between its federal government 
and its ten provinces and three territories.
18
  Canada’s constitution 
allocates treaty-making authority at the federal level.
19
  However, when 
the subject matter of a treaty is in a field in which Canada’s provinces 
                                                 
16 See Settlement of International Investment Disputes Act, S.B.C. 2006, 
c. 16 (Can. B.C.); Settlement of International Investment Disputes Act, S.N.L. 
2006, c S-13.3 (Can. N.L.); Settlement of International Disputes Act, S.O. 
1999, c. 12, Schedule D (Can. Ont.); Settlement of International Investment 
Disputes Act, S.S. 2006, c. S-47.2 (Can. Sask.); Settlement of International 
Investment Disputes Act, S.Nu. 2006, c. 13 (Can. Nun.); Settlement of 
International Investment Disputes Act, S.N.W.T. 2009, c. 15 (Can. N.W.T.) 
17 See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in 
R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 5 (Can.) [hereinafter Constitution]. 
18 Id. ss. 91 & 92. 
19 The federal government’s treaty-making authority is not explicitly 
conferred under any constitutional provision though is a power that is 
recognized to have devolved upon it. This stems from Canada’s British 
tradition, where international relations are a prerogative of the Crown, which, 
in Canada, is exercised by the federal executive branch of the government as 
the Crown’s representative. See LAURA BARNETT, LEGAL LEGIS. AFFAIRS DIV., 
CANADA’S APPROACH TO THE TREATY MAKING PROCESS (2008), 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0845-e.htm.; see 
also Capital Cities Commc’ns Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television Comm’n, 
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 141 (Can.).  
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and territories have authority in accordance with the constitution,
20
 the 
provinces and territories have the power to implement the treaty.
21
  
Whether constitutionally, by practice, or as a matter of political 
pragmaticism, the federal government seeks provincial and territorial 
support when the subject matter of a treaty includes areas that fall 
within their jurisdiction.
22
  Because the ICSID Convention relates to 
areas of provincial and territorial jurisdiction, including “the 
administration of justice” and “property and civil rights,” provincial 
and territorial implementing legislation is needed or at least desirable 
before Canada’s ratification.23  
This is not the first time Canada has been slow to ratify a treaty 
relating to international arbitration.  Canada took almost thirty years to 
ratify the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).
24
  Entered into force 
in June 1959, the New York Convention provides common legislative 
and judicial standards for the recognition of arbitration agreements as 
well as standards for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards.
25
  However, unlike with the ICSID Convention, once 
Canada’s federal government decided to sign the New York 
Convention, it quickly received provincial and territorial support.
26
 
Canada ratified the New York Convention in August 1986.
27
 
                                                 
20 See Constitution, ss. 91 & 92.  
21 See Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Ontario (Att’y Gen.), (1937) 1 D.L.R. 673 
(Can.) (Labour Conventions Case); see also PETER W. HOGG, Q.C. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, 11.5 (b), (Carswell, 5th ed. Supp. 2007). 
22 BARNETT, supra note 19. 
23 ICSID, supra note 4 (The ICSID Convention addresses issues of 
arbitral procedure and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, both 
of which fall within provincial jurisdiction over the administration of justice 
(ss. 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867) and property and civil rights (ss. 
92(13))).    
24 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, (1968) 7 I.L.M. 1046 [hereinafter 
New York Convention], available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral 
/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NY Convention.html   
25 Id. 
26 Edward C. Chiasson, Canada No Man’s Land No More, 3 J. INT’L 
ARB. 67 (1986). 
27 E.g. Edward C. Chiasson & Marc Lalonde, Recent Canadian 
Legislation on Arbitration 2 ARB. INT’L 370 (1986); Chiasson, supra note 25. 
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Given the apparent desire for consensus in ratifying the ICSID 
Convention, the possibility exists that some provinces are using the 
implementing legislation as a bargaining chip in federal-provincial 
negotiations with regard to other issues. Another possibility why 
Canada has not implemented the legislation is that legislative agendas 
are crowded and seeking consensus in putting forward ratification 
legislation on an international treaty may simply not be a political 
priority.  Unfortunately, Canadian corporations that invest 
internationally have done little to press for ratification. Moreover, it 
may be an unfortunate political reality that treaty ratification is not a 
“vote-getting” issue. 
Regardless of the reasons for the delay, it has never been suggested 
that concerns about the merits of ICSID is any part of the problem.
28
  
When Canada’s House of Commons considered ratification legislation, 
Members of Parliament, from all parties and regions, generally agreed 
that ratification is in Canada’s interest.29  Indeed, in the many years 
since ICSID came into existence, irrespective of the governing political 
party at any point in time, Canada’s federal government has been trying 
to get the provincial and territorial governments to not only commit to 
act, but to actually act.
30
 
 
C. MOVING WITHOUT FULL SUPPORT? 
Some signs indicate that Canada’s federal government might move 
to ratify the Convention despite the lack of implementing legislation in 
all of its provinces and territories.  One indication came during 
parliamentary debates and hearings when Parliament was considering 
                                                 
28 Some commentators have raised the issue that ratification of the ICSID 
Convention deserves thoughtful consideration given the limited possibilities for 
review of ICSID awards. At the moment, all arbitral awards against Canada can 
be challenged before domestic courts where public policy considerations can be 
taken into account. An award made by an ICSID tribunal, however, can only be 
challenged in annulment proceedings before a tribunal internally appointed by 
ICSID on very narrow grounds.  See generally J. Anthony Vanduzer & 
Anthony R. Daimsis, A Closer Look at Canada’s Imminent Accession to the 
ICSID Convention, 35 CAN. COUNCIL ON INT’L. L. BULLETIN (ELECTRONIC) 
(2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1474319. 
29 Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 39th Parliament, 1st 
Session, vol. 141, issue 154, May 15, 2007, available at http://www.parl 
.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2945948&Language=E&M
ode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1. 
30 Id. 
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federal implementing legislation.
31
  Parliamentarians and officials 
stated that Canada could designate the provinces and territories that 
wish to be party to ICSID as “constituent subdivisions” in accordance 
with the Convention’s “federal clause.”32  Article 70 of the ICSID 
Convention would allow Canada to identify, by written notice, the 
provinces and territories to which the treaty would not apply.
33
  These 
provinces and territories would eventually be able to join once they 
pass their own implementing legislation.
34
  
This approach, however, is not without dissent.  Some opposition 
members in the federal Parliament maintained that the “constituent 
subdivision” approach would violate Canada’s constitutional division 
of powers and would constitute a “wrongful abrogation” of the federal 
government’s control over international relations.35  A definitive 
constitutional position on the part of the federal government, if it has 
one, has not been made public.  
Another argument against this approach is that by ratifying the 
ICSID Convention without implementing legislation in all provinces 
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 ICSID, supra note 4, at 202. 
33 Id.  (“This convention shall apply to all territories for whose 
international relations a Contracting State is responsible, except those which 
are excluded by such State by written notice to the depositary of this 
Convention either at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval or 
subsequently.”) 
34 Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and International Development. Evidence. (November 22, 
2007), 39th Parliament, 2nd Session, available at http://www.parl.gc.ca 
/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3133571&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses
=2&Language=E#Int-2214104. During the time when the federal 
implementation legislation was being considered, then Senior General Counsel 
and Director General of Canada’s Trade Law Bureau, Meg Kinnear, now 
Secretary General of ICSID, testified before the Parliamentary Committee that: 
“What the federal government has said to all the provinces is that if you want to 
be what’s called “designated” as a constituent subdivision, just tell us and we 
will do that . . . .  So we have said that this is up to you, and if at any time later 
you decide that you would like to be designated, just tell the federal 
government. There is no problem with that, but it’s totally up to the province to 
decide when they would like to do that.”   Provinces that have yet to pass 
supporting legislation include Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova 
Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Quebec, and with the Yukon the only 
territory.) 
35 See generally comments of Mrs. Vivian Barbot, MP, supra note 29. 
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and territories, Canada may be violating its treaty obligations under the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).
36
  
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention states that “[e]very treaty in force 
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith,”37 and Article 27 states that “a party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a 
treaty.”38  On the international stage, Canada alone is responsible for 
the actions of its constituent subdivisions and would not be able to 
preclude its responsibility for an internationally wrongful act 
committed by a province or territory that has not passed implementing 
legislation.
39
  Nonetheless, as noted above, Article 70 of the ICSID 
Convention seems to allow for such an arrangement so that ratification 
on a constituent subdivision basis would not violate the Vienna 
Convention. 
Lastly, moving forward with the ratification process without full 
provincial and territorial concurrency could have political implications 
in Canada as a deviation from Canada’s ordinary treaty implementation 
practice.  Few would disagree that unanimous provincial and territorial 
ratification is preferable in Canada’s federal state environment.  
Moreover, partial applicability of ICSID in Canada could complicate 
investment transactions and distort economic relations among 
provinces and territories.  
In the absence of unanimity after an unduly prolonged time and 
considerable effort, the alternative of ratifying the ICSID Convention 
under the “constituent subdivisions” approach may be the best 
achievable option.  It might also “put feet to the fire” in the foot-
dragging provinces and territories.  Given the history described above, 
and the benefits that likely would come from ICSID membership, 
proceeding by this approach may be in the best interests of the 
Canadian economy and Canadian businesses that invest internationally.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
37 Id. at 339, 8 I.L.M. at 690.  
38 Id.  
39 See BARNETT, supra note 19 and infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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D. EXAMPLES WHERE ACCESS TO ICSID ARBITRATION MIGHT BE 
RELEVANT 
Recently, there have been instances in which Canadian investors 
may have benefitted in having access to arbitration under ICSID 
Convention.  
First Quantum Minerals v. Democratic Republic of Congo 
First Quantum Minerals Ltd. (First Quantum)’s dispute with the 
Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the most publicized examples of a 
Canadian company investing in a foreign country that could have 
benefitted from Canada’s membership to ICSID.  In 1997, First 
Quantum, agreed to invest US $553 million in a copper mining project 
in the DRC.
40
  In exchange, First Quantum got the rights to build and 
operate the mine for at least twenty-two years.
41
  However, after First 
Quantum had put into place eighty percent of the mining infrastructure, 
the DRC government seized the mine and declared the contract 
cancelled.
42
  
Canada does not have a FIPA with the DRC, however, the DRC is 
a member of ICSID and provides for ICSID arbitration through its 
Mining Code.
43
  As Canada is not a Contracting State of ICSID, First 
Quantum could not bring its claim under ICSID.  Nonetheless, DRC’s 
Mining Code also provides that nationals whose home state is not an 
ICSID member can bring a dispute “to any arbitration tribunal of their 
choice.”44  In February 2010, First Quantum, and its co-investors in the 
                                                 
40 Uzma Sulaiman, Investing in the DRC: Horror or Hope?, 5 GLOBAL 
ARB. REV. Iss. 2 (2010), available at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com 
/journal/article/28366/investing-drc-horror-hope.  
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 “[D]isputes which might result from the interpretation or application of 
the provisions of the present Code may be settled, at the request of the party 
who proceeds first, by arbitration in accordance with the Convention on the 
Settlement of Disputes Relating to Investments between the State and Nationals 
of other States, provided that the holder is a “National” of another contracting 
state according to the terms of Article 25 of said convention.”  Mining Code, 
Law No. 007/2002 of July 11, 2002, art 319 ¶ 1, http://www.miningcongo.cd 
/codeminier/codeminier_eng.pdf. 
44 Id. art. 319 ¶ 3. “Holders who are not Nationals of another contracting 
state may submit disputes resulting from the interpretation or application of the 
provisions of the present Code to any arbitration tribunal of their choice, but 
must notify the Government of the name, address and regulations of the 
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DRC project, the International Finance Corporation and South Africa’s 
Industrial Development Corporation, initiated International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) arbitration in Paris against the DRC.
45
  
In August 2010, the DRC withdrew another of First Quantum’s 
mining permits and ordered it to leave.
46
  First Quantum asserted that 
DRC’s action was an act of retribution for its commencement of ICC 
arbitration over its initial project.
47
  With regard to this latest dispute, 
First Quantum has circumvented Canada’s failure to ratify the ICSID 
Convention by registering the dispute with ICSID in October 2010 
through its Barbadian subsidiary, International Quantum Resources 
Limited.
48
  Barbados has been a party to the ICSID Convention since 
1983.
49
 
 
Canadian Gold Mining Companies in Venezuela 
Further examples of Canadian foreign investors that could have 
used the benefits of the ICSID Convention include three gold mining 
companies with operations in Venezuela.  Before President Hugo 
Chavez nationalized all gold mines in Venezuela in August 2011,
50
 
                                                                                                 
arbitration tribunal on the date on which the mining title is issued at the Mining 
Registry.”  
45 SULAIMAN, supra note 40; see also Andrew de Lotbinière McDougall, 
Is the System Working: What Lessons Can Be Learned From A Canadian 
Trilogy Of Investor Claims (AbitibiBowater, Chemtura, First Quantum 
Minerals)?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG, (Sept. 15, 2010), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/ 2010/09/15/is-the-system-working-
what-lessons-can-be-learned-from-a-canadian-trilogy-of-investor-claims-
abitibibowater-chemtura-first-quantum-minerals/. 
46 Press Release, First Quantum Minerals Ltd., First Quantum Minerals 
Announces the Suspension of Operations at its Frontier Mine in the Dem. Rep. 
Congo (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.mining-reporter.com/index.php/ 
component/content/article/348-first-quantum-minerals-ltd/4947-first-quantum-
minerals-announces-the-suspension-of-operations-at-its-frontier-mine-in-the-
democratic-republic-of-congo. 
47 Id. 
48 See ICSID, List of Pending Cases at No. 98, ICSID (last updated Sep. 
22, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=Gen 
CaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending (listing Int’l Quantum Resources Ltd. v. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/21, Filed (Oct. 
22, 2010)).  
49 ICSID, List of Contracting States, supra note 5. 
50 Hugo Chavez Officially Nationalizes Venezuela’s Gold Industry, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 23, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/24/ 
venezuela-gold-industry-huge-chavez_n_934968.html. 
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three Canadian companies, Vanessa Ventures Ltd. (now Infinito Gold 
Ltd.), Gold Reserve Inc., and Crystallex International Corporation, had 
outstanding claims against the country.
51
  Although Canada has a FIPA 
with Venezuela,
52
 all three cases are proceeding by way of the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules.  Under these rules, any award in favor of an 
investor that the investor attempts to enforce in Venezuela would be 
subject to review by Venezuelan courts. 
 
E. NEXT STEPS 
Canadian international arbitration and trade law practitioners have 
long attempted to persuade senior Canadian federal and provincial 
government officials that it is in Canada’s interest to join ICSID.  
Canada’s ratification of the ICSID Convention is now regularly raised 
by Canadian international arbitration and trade law organizations, 
including through the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the 
Canadian Bar Association.
53
  The availability of binding ICSID 
arbitration would increase investor confidence in Canada because it 
would reduce investor risk and make Canada an even more attractive 
location for foreign investment.  Moreover, Canadians investing in 
foreign countries would similarly enjoy reduced risks and reduced costs 
in their foreign investment activities.  The majority of countries in 
which Canadian companies most frequently and most heavily invest are 
ICSID members (excluding Mexico, India, and Brazil).
54
 
                                                 
51 See ICSID, List of Pending Cases, supra note 5, (listing Vannessa 
Ventures Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/04/6, Filed (Oct. 28, 2004); Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Filed (Nov. 9, 2009); Crystallex 
Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/11/2, Filed (Mar. 9, 2011)). 
52 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of 
the Republic of Venezuela for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
Can.-Venez., Jul. 1, 1996, 2221 UNTS 7, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202221/v2221.pdf.   
53 Andrew McDougall & Barry Leon, Upcoming G20 Meeting in Canada 
Presents an Opportunity for Canada to Join ICSID, N. AM. FREE TRADE & INV, 
REPORT, March 31, 2010, http://www.perlaw.ca/ media/Lawyer_Articles_PDF/ 
Published_BLeon_and_AMcDougall_Upcoming_G20_Meeting_in_Canada_Pr
esents_an_Opportunity_for_Canada_to_Join_ICSID_Article_Only.pdf.  
54 See ICSID, List of Contracting States, supra note 5.  
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Until the necessary implementing legislation is brought into force 
throughout the country, or Canada’s federal government decides to 
proceed with ratification without all of the provinces and territories on 
board, the ICSID Convention does not protect Canadian international 
investors or foreign investors investing in Canada.  Thus, Canada is 
risking significant economic benefits.  As one of the two G-8 
countries
55
 and one of the three OECD members
56
 that have not ratified 
the ICSID Convention, Canada seems long overdue to provide foreign 
investors and Canadians investing internationally with the full 
protections and benefits that come with ICSID membership.
57
  
 
II.  ITAS AND FEDERALISM: WHO’S LEFT HOLDING THE BILL? 
Another issue between the federal government and provinces and 
territories is who should be liable for the damages awarded against 
Canada in an ITA arbitration when the actions of a constituent 
subdivision (a sub-federal entity) constituted the breach of the treaty 
obligation.  This issue came to the fore with Canada’s recent settlement 
with AbitibiBowater Inc. regarding the province of Newfoundland and 
Labrador’s alleged violation of AbitibiBowater’s investments rights 
through an act of its provincial legislature.  In April 2009, 
AbitibiBowater, a forestry company incorporated in the United States, 
initiated NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitration for CDN $500 million 
claiming that Canada had breached its obligations as a result of 
Newfoundland and Labrador’s Bill 75, entitled An Act to Return to the 
Crown Certain Rights Relating to Timber and Water use Vested in 
Abitibi-Consolidated and to Expropriate Assets and Lands Associated 
with the Generation of Electricity Enabled by Those Water Use Rights 
(Act).
58
  The Act essentially served to expropriate most of 
AbitibiBowater’s investments in the province, including its timber and 
water rights.  Only a state party to NAFTA (Canada, United States, or 
Mexico) can be liable to compensate an investor from another NAFTA 
party for a breach of Chapter Eleven.
59
  One of the key investment 
                                                 
55 Id. Russia has yet to ratify the Convention although it signed the treaty 
in 1992.  
56 Id. Mexico and Poland have not signed the Convention.   
57 See Barry Leon & Andrew de Lotbinière McDougall, Why has Canada 
Not Ratified the ICSID Convention?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (August 24, 2010, 
9:15 PM), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/08/24/why-has-canada-
not-ratified-the-icsid-convention/. 
58 Abitibi-Consolidated Rights and Assets Act, R.S.N.L. 2008, c. A-1.01. 
59 NAFTA, supra note 3. 
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protection provisions of Chapter Eleven is Article 1110 which prevents 
a NAFTA party from expropriating the investments of an investor from 
another NAFTA party without fair compensation.
60
   
Canada settled the claim for CDN $130 million in August 2010, 
leading to a consent award in December 2010.
61
  The settlement was 
not without controversy as some commentators questioned whether 
Canada should have settled, and the amount for which it settled.
62
  The 
federal government could have continued on with the arbitration, 
covered all related costs, and been left with the option of trying to 
distance itself from an unfavorable award.  Instead, the settlement 
demonstrates that the investment treaty protection system under 
NAFTA works and that Canada recognizes its importance and, in 
appropriate circumstances, the need to voluntarily honor the investor 
protection commitments it has made.  
The settlement highlighted a particular challenge of ITAs, such as 
NAFTA, in federal states like Canada, the United States, and Mexico.  
As noted, the actions leading to the claim were not ones of Canada’s 
federal government but actions of one of Canada’s provinces.  
However, in accordance with NAFTA, the claim was brought against 
the federal state which had to defend and ultimately settle the claim.  
This demonstrates how a state can be financially responsible for its 
constituent subdivisions and be left to pay for actions that it did not 
take and had no constitutional or practical authority to prevent. 
Following the settlement, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
stated that the federal government did not intend to seek reimbursement 
from Newfoundland and Labrador, but that in the future, “should 
provincial actions cause significant legal obligations for the 
                                                 
60 Id. at art.1110(1), (“No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or 
expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take 
a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment 
(“expropriation”), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory 
basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on 
payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.”)  
61 AbitibiBowater Inc. v. The Gov’t of Canada, (ICSID) Consent Award, 
Dec. 15, 2010, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords 
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Abitibi_Consent_Award_Dec_15_2010.pdf.  
62 Scott Sinclair, $130 Million NAFTA Payout Sets Troubling Precedent, 
CANADIAN Ctr. FOR POLICY ALT. (March 22, 2011), http://www.policy 
alternatives.ca/publications/commentary/130-million-nafta-payout-sets-
troubling-precedent. 
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government of Canada, the government of Canada will create a 
mechanism so that it can reclaim monies lost through international 
trade processes.”63  
There has been no clarification of what that mechanism would be 
or whether it would be imposed unilaterally.  Nonetheless, financial 
arrangements between the federal government and provinces and 
territories are most often cooperatively negotiated.
64
  Whatever the 
arrangement, the federal government may have to move quickly 
because NAFTA Chapter Eleven complaints
65
 continue to be brought 
as a result of provincial and territorial actions.
66
  Many aspects of 
environmental, human health and property regulation fall under 
provincial and territorial constitutional jurisdiction and are likely to 
continue to be a source of future claims. 
 
A. NAFTA CASES RELATING TO PROVINCIAL MEASURES 
Canada had two new NAFTA notices filed against it in 2011 based 
on Ontario’s environmental regulations.  First, St. Mary’s Cement, a 
United States corporation, filed a Notice of Intent on May 11, 2011, 
                                                 
63 Bertrand Marotte & John Ibbitson, Provinces on Hook for Future 
Trade Disputes: Harper, THE GLOBE & MAIL (August 26, 2010), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/abitibi-deal-best-
available-harper/article1686431/?cmpid=rss1. 
64 See HOGG, supra note 21, at  ¶ 6.9. 
65 NAFTA Chapter Eleven complaints are first brought by way of a 
“Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration” before a claim is formalized 
under a “Notice of Arbitration.” Some complaints do not progress past the 
Notice of Intent. Of the six active complaints relating to constituent subdivision 
measures, the three most recent complaints have yet to progress past their 
Notice of Intent: John R. Andre (U.S.) v. Gov’t of Canada, Notice of Intent 
(Mar. 19, 2010); St. Marys VCNA, LLC (U.S.) v. Gov’t of Canada, Notice of 
Intent (May 13, 2011); and, Mesa Power Group LLC (U.S.) v. Gov’t of 
Canada, Notice of Intent (July 6, 2011).  
66 Clayton/Bilcon (U.S.) v.  Gov’t of Canada, Statement of the Claim 
(Jan. 30, 2009); John R. Andre (U.S.) v. Gov’t of Canada, Notice of Intent 
(Mar. 19, 2010); Mobil Investments Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation v. Gov’t 
of Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF) 07/4, Request for Arbitration (Nov. 1, 
2007); St. Marys VCNA, LLC (U.S.)v. Gov’t of Canada, Notice of Intent (May 
13, 2011); Mesa Power Group LLC  (U.S.) v. Gov’t of Canada, Notice of Intent 
(July 6, 2011), and V.G. Gallo (U.S.) v.  Gov’t of Canada, Statement of the 
Claim (June 23, 2008). See Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 
Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada, http://www.international. 
gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/gov.aspx?lang=en& 
view=d. 
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alleging that the denial of a quarry permit by the Ontario government 
was discriminatory and motivated by political concerns in breach of 
NAFTA Chapter Eleven’s fair and equitable treatment obligations.67  
Second, Mesa Power served its Notice of Intent on July 6, 2011, 
complaining that Ontario’s Green Energy Act68 resulted in denials of 
access to the feed-in-tariff (FIT) program for a number of wind power 
projects in southwestern Ontario owned by the American corporation.
69
  
Mesa Power Group asserts that changes in regulations for granting 
access to the electricity grid and awarding wind power contracts led to 
a decline in the value of its projects under the FIT program and 
contravened Canada’s NAFTA obligations.70  
These two cases join the list of four other ongoing NAFTA 
Chapter Eleven complaints against Canada resulting from provincial 
and territorial measures.
71
  It appears that the issue of constituent 
subdivision responsibility for actions giving rise to ITA claims will 
need to be dealt with in Canada sooner rather than later. In response to 
Canada’s settlement with AbitibiBowater, one lead editorial in 
Canada’s principal mainstream newspaper has already called for a 
solution:  
[T]he federal government should not simply wait for 
the next problem of this kind to come up. It should 
diplomatically, but firmly, make clear to the 
provinces that it is thinking about specific options. 
The taxpayers of Canada need some concrete 
                                                 
67 See St. Marys VCNA, LLC v. Gov’t of Canada, Notice of Intent (filed 
May 13, 2011) available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/st_marys_vcna.aspx?lang=eng&view=d.  
68 Green Energy Act, S.O. 2009, c. 12, Sch. A (Can. Ont.). 
69 Mesa Power Group LLC v. Gov’t of Canada, Notice of Intent (filed 
July 6, 2011) available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/mesa.aspx?lang=eng&view=d. 
70 Id. 
71 Clayton/Bilcon v. Canada, Notice of Intent (filed Feb. 5, 2008) (N.S.); 
John R. Andre v. Canada, Notice of Intent (filed Mar. 19, 2010) (N.W.T.); 
Mobil Invs, Inc. and Murphy Oil Corp. v. Canada Notice of Intent, (filed Aug. 
3, 2007) (Nfld. & L.); V.G. Gallo v. Canada, Notice of Intent (filed Oct. 12, 
2006) (Ont.), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/gov.aspx?lang=en&view=d.  
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assurance that they will not have to pick up another 
such tab.
72
  
Until the federal government establishes an arrangement with its 
provinces and territories regarding the costs of ITA claims that are 
based on the actions of a constituent subdivision, the federal 
government is left in the position of defending these claims without any 
assurance that its sub-federal entities will cooperate and help cover the 
financial costs of settling claims and satisfying awards.  Canada’s 
NAFTA partners, the United States and Mexico, both of which are 
federal states, may also need to consider developing comprehensive 
solutions to this issue.
73
 
 
III.  HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REGULATIONS 
– CHEMTURA CORP.  V. CANADA 
Canada’s experience with NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitration 
appears to have placed it at the forefront of responding to investor-state 
claims relating to health and environmental protection regulation.  
Canada has risen to prominence given its victory in the NAFTA case 
Chemtura v. Canada.
74
  Chemtura Corporation, an American 
agricultural pesticide products manufacturer, alleged that, through its 
Pest Management Regulatory Agency (PMRA), the government of 
Canada wrongfully terminated Chemtura’s pesticide business in 
lindane-based products.
75
  Chemtura claimed that Canada breached its 
NAFTA Chapter Eleven obligations through its regulatory actions, in 
particular Article 1110 (Expropriation) and Article 1105 (Minimum 
Standard of Treatment/Fair and Equitable Treatment).
76
  Not only did 
                                                 
72 Editorial, How Ottawa could avoid getting stuck with the provinces’ 
bills, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 29, 2010, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/ 
news/opinions/editorials/how-ottawa-could-avoid-getting-stuck-with-the-
provinces-bills/article1688337/. 
73 See also Barry Leon & Andrew McDougall, Left Holding the Bill: Can 
the NAFTA Countries Recover from Their Constituent Territories?, N. AM. 
FREE TRADE & INV. REP., Vol. 21, No. 1, Jan. 1, 2011, available at 
http://www.perlaw.ca/en/newsroom/publications/2011/1/1/left-holding-the-bill-
can-the-nafta-countries-recover; McDougall, Is the System Working, supra note 
45.  
74 Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award, Aug. 2, 
2010 [Chemtura], available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/crompton.aspx?lang=en&view=d. 
75 Id. at ¶ 7. 
76 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1110 & 1105. 
2011] CANADA AND INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: 81  
 THREE PROMINENT ISSUES—ICSID RATIFICATION, 
 CONSTITUENT SUBDIVISIONS, AND HEALTH AND 
 ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
 
the unanimous tribunal reject Chemtura’s US $80.2 million claim, it 
ordered Chemtura to pay for the costs of the arbitration, including 
approximately CDN $3 million towards Canada’s legal fees.77  The 
arbitral tribunal found that the PMRA “took measures within its 
mandate, in a non-discriminatory manner, motivated by the increasing 
awareness of the dangers presented by lindane for human health and the 
environment.”78  The tribunal held that the “the measure adopted under 
such circumstances is a valid exercise of [Canada]’s police powers and, 
as a result, does not constitute [a violation of Canada’s NAFTA 
Chapter Eleven obligations].”79 
The decision in Chemtura is significant in relation to investor 
claims based on health and environmental protection regulation.  The 
award demonstrates that legitimate measures do not necessarily conflict 
with a state’s ITA obligations.80  A longstanding criticism of investor-
state arbitration is that it affords investors of the host state’s ITA 
partner greater rights than that of its own domestic investors, while at 
the same time curtailing a state’s public policy choices.81  Arguably, 
this criticism of the potential chilling effect of investor-state arbitration 
on public regulations was initially merited given Canada’s first 
experience under NAFTA Chapter Eleven.  
Ethyl v. Canada 
In Ethyl v. Canada, Canada settled a claim by the American 
chemical producer that its import ban of a gasoline additive, MMT, was 
contrary to NAFTA’s investor protections.82  A key factor in Canada’s 
decision to settle the case was the lack of scientific evidence available 
to support the ban.
83
  In its Statement of Defence, Canada 
                                                 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at ¶ 266. 
79 Id.  
80 See also McDougall, Is the System Working, supra note 45. 
81 See Howard Mann & Konrad von Moltke, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and 
the Environment: Addressing the Impacts of the Investor-State Process on the 
Environment, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., at 13-14 (1999) available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf; see also Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto, 
Environmental and Health Regulation: Assessing Liability Under Investment 
Treaties 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1. (2011). 
82 Ethyl Corp. v. Gov’t of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Statement of 
Claim (Oct. 2, 1997), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/ethyl3.pdf.    
83 Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 81, at 29.   
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acknowledged that the effects of low quantities of MMT were 
unknown.  However, Canada argued that its measure was not 
expropriatory “because it involve[d] the exercise of regulatory power or 
‘police’ power” and that “the Act was enacted for the maintenance of 
health, for the conservation of clean air and for the protection of the 
environment.”84  Having lost its jurisdictional argument85 and three 
similar challenges under the dispute settlement mechanisms of the 
Agreement on Internal Trade,
86
 Canada repealed the ban and paid Ethyl 
US $19.3 million.
87
   
Critics of the settlement found it disturbing that NAFTA enabled 
Ethyl to compel a foreign government to lift a ban, something which 
Ethyl could not have compelled its own domestic government to do.
88
  
Despite the fact that a state should be able to adopt regulations to 
protect against potential health and environmental threats, a foreign 
investor should not bear the risks of the state adopting a measure that is 
not scientifically supported.
89
  The same reasoning also applies where a 
state tries to cast a measure as a health or environmental regulation in 
order to justify its imposition, which was Canada’s experience in S.D. 
Myers v. Canada.
90
  
S.D. Myers v. Canada 
Canada’s next foray into NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitration 
relating to health and environmental protection regulations dealt with 
its temporary export ban on PCB waste in late 1995.  In S.D. Myers v. 
Canada, an American investor claimed that the export ban breached 
                                                 
84 Ethyl Corp. v. Gov’t of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Statement of 
Defence ¶ 95 (Nov. 27, 1997), available at http://www.international.gc.ca 
/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/ethyl4.pdf.   
85 Ethyl Corp. v. Gov’t of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Preliminary 
Tribunal Award on Jurisdiction (June 24, 1998), available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/ethyl6.pdf.   
86 See Agreement on International Trade, Consolidated Version, Canada, 
July, 1, 1995, available at http://www.ait-aci.ca/index_en/ait.htm.                  
87 Shawn McCarthy, Failed Ban Becomes  Selling Point for MMT, THE 
GLOBE & MAIL. July 21, 1998, at A3. 
88 H. Hammer Hill, NAFTA and Environmental Protection: The First Ten 
Years 6 J.I.J.I.S. 157, 161 (2006). 
89 Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 81, at 30. 
90 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Govt. of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Partial 
Award (Nov. 13, 2000), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/myersvcanadapartialaward_final_13-11-
00.pdf.   
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Canada’s NAFTA obligations.91 Canada tried to defend its actions 
citing health and environmental reasons for the adoption of its 
measure;
92
 however, statements made by Canadian officials and 
government documents indicated that the real objective was to protect 
domestic interests.  The NAFTA tribunal held that “there was no 
legitimate environmental reason for introducing the ban” as “the 
documentary record as a whole clearly indicates that the Interim Order 
and the Final Order [to ban the export of PCB waste] were intended 
primarily to protect the Canadian PCB disposal industry from U.S. 
competition.”93  While the tribunal acknowledged that government 
intent is “complex and multifaceted,”94 it found that there was enough 
evidence on the record to indicate Canada’s protectionist intent.95  The 
tribunal held that Canada breached its national treatment (Article 1102) 
and fair and equitable treatment (Article 1105) obligations and ordered 
Canada to pay S.D. Myers just over CDN $6 million in damages.
96
  
Dow AgroSciences LLC v. Canada 
In March 2009, while Chemtura was ongoing, Dow AgroSciences 
LLC, a United States-based corporation, served a Notice of Arbitration 
under NAFTA Chapter Eleven seeking US $2 million in damages for 
losses stemming from the Government of Quebec’s ban on the sale and 
certain uses of lawn pesticides containing the active ingredient 2,4-D.
97
 
Dow AgroSciences claimed that Quebec’s actions violated its rights to 
fair and equitable treatment (Article 1105) and was tantamount to 
expropriation (Article 1110) under NAFTA.
98
  Although Quebec 
claimed that it adopted the measure for health and environmental 
reasons, the claimant alleged that “there was no evidence that 2,4-D 
posed a health or safety risk to humans,”99 that Quebec was aware of 
                                                 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at ¶ 152.  
93 Id. at ¶¶ 194-195. 
94 Id. at ¶ 161. 
95 Id. at ¶ 162. 
96 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Govt. of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Second 
Partial Award ¶ 311 (Dec. 21, 2002), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/MyersPA.pdf.   
97 Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Gov’t of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), 
Notice of Arbitration, (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/agrosciences_archive
.aspx?lang=en&view=d.  
98 Id. ¶¶ 47-53.  
99 Id. ¶ 20. 
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this, and that it was motivated by political considerations rather than 
any legitimate scientific concerns.
100
 
 Given the similar fact scenario involving the ban of a chemical, 
the case bore a close resemblance to Chemtura.  It does not appear to 
be a coincidence that Dow AgroSciences settled its claim soon after the 
Chemtura award was rendered.
101
  The settlement was reached without 
resort to arbitration.  Under the terms of the settlement, Quebec 
maintained its ban on 2,4-D and Dow AgroSciences did not receive any 
compensation.  Quebec, however, acknowledged the Department of 
Health Canada’s conclusion that products containing 2,4-D do not pose 
an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment provided that 
users follow the instructions on the label.
102
  Following the settlement, 
Canada’s Minister of International Trade stated that “[t]his agreement 
with Dow AgroSciences demonstrates that the NAFTA dispute 
settlement mechanism works,” and that the agreement “confirms the 
right of governments to regulate the use of pesticides [which] will not 
be compromised by Canada’s participation in NAFTA or any other 
trade agreement.”103 
The result in Dow AgroSciences and the decision in Chemtura 
demonstrate that states are able to make legitimate policy decisions 
based on sound scientific evidence and, at the same time, comply with 
their obligations in ITAs. Experience has also shown that political 
motivations masked as public policy concerns will not stand the 
scrutiny of investor-state tribunals.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Canada has been, and likely will continue to be, a dynamic 
participant in international investment arbitration.  While Canadian 
foreign investors are increasingly active internationally and Canada 
continues to be an attractive venue for foreign investment, Canada’s 
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ratification of the ICSID Convention would only further complement 
both fronts.  There are some encouraging signs as Canada’s business 
and legal communities are drawing greater attention to Canada’s failure 
to ratify the ICSID Convention.  
Canada’s federal structure plays an important part in its situation 
regarding ICSID, just as it plays an important part in its inability to 
hold its constituent subdivisions accountable for their breaches of 
Canada’s ITA obligations.  However, the knife cuts both ways.  Critics 
argue that Canada’s federal government should not use its treaty-
making power to impose broad foreign investor rights that constrain the 
ability of provincial and territorial governments to legislate and 
regulate on behalf of their citizens in areas of exclusive provincial and 
territorial jurisdiction.
104
  One commentator has gone so far as to say 
that “[w]e are witnessing a constitutional train wreck in slow 
motion.”105  
Whether this train wreck will ever happen remains to be seen. 
Canada’s experience with ITA claims relating to health and 
environmental protection measures offer hope that it can be avoided.  
Canada’s experience shows that provincial, territorial and federal 
public policy measures can align with Canada’s ITA obligations.  In 
moving forward, Canada can remain confident that the dispute 
settlement mechanisms in its investment treaties can and do work. 
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